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In this essay I focus on the question of why we are attracted to abstract art (perhaps more
accurately, non-representational or object-free art). After elaborating on the processing of
visual art in general and abstract art in particular, I discuss recent data from neuroscience
and behavioral studies related to abstract art. I conclude with several speculations
concerning our apparent appeal to this particular type of art. In particular, I claim that
abstract art frees our brain from the dominance of reality, enabling it to flow within its
inner states, create new emotional and cognitive associations, and activate brain-states
that are otherwise harder to access. This process is apparently rewarding as it enables
the exploration of yet undiscovered inner territories of the viewer’s brain.
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ART AND REALITY
Over the course of human evolution, the phenomenon of art
appeared some 30,000 years ago and humans became increasingly
occupied with creating and appreciating works of art (Humphery,
1999; Solso, 1999). Art works are sensed and perceived via
the same neuronal machinery and anatomical routes that were
primarily developed for interacting with, and comprehending,
“reality”. These mechanisms evolved in order for us to acquire
and analyze sensory information from the world around us and,
consequently, to successfully and adaptively behave in an ever-
changing environment (see the “Perception Action loop” theory
in Tishby and Polani, 2011).
The visual system, which is the vehicle that processes visual
art, is aimed at filtering, organizing and putting (functional)
order to the enormous amount of data streaming into our visual
system. Interestingly, at early stages of visual processing, the
visual scene is deconstructed into its elementary components
such as spots of light, lines, edges, simple forms, colors, move-
ment, etc. At later (higher) stages, the system reconstructs these
components into complicated forms and objects: a moving car,
a face with blinking eyes, a pirouette of a dancer (Zeki, 1992;
Hubel, 1998). Being an efficient learning machine, our brain
uses bidirectional (“top down” and “bottom up”) processing
schemes and algorithms for visual scene analysis. Namely, we first
build (predict) a tentative model, an optional representation, of
the visual world and this model is then verified and updated
with increased accuracy against the “evidence” presented by the
sensory stimulus (Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002; Bar, 2007; Tishby
and Polani, 2011). These ongoing bidirectional processes enable
us to make quick and effective generalizations and decisions about
the world.
In contrast to the processing of daily objects, art is free from
the functional restrictions imposed on the visual system during
our daily life. Art is very often engaged in finding new ways
to organize and represent objects and scenery. Artists are liber-
ated to represent and to decompose depicted objects in various
non-functional (non –“realistic”) ways. Examples are works by
artists of the Cubist (e.g., George Braque and Pablo Picasso)
or Surrealist (e.g., Salvador Dali and Juan Miro) movements.
Artworks could also be only partially faithful representations of
our daily visual experience, such as the monochromatic blue
figures of Pablo Picasso or the blue horses of Franz Marc, and it
can be “free” from obeying the laws of physics (e.g., the flying
figures of Marc Chagall or the impossible objects of E.C. Escher).
Apparently we categorize some inputs as artworks while others
as non-art. We make this distinction based on contextual, cul-
tural and perceptual parameters. Interestingly, a major distinction
between perceiving an object as piece of art or as part of the
daily visual (non-art) experience, relies on the presence of artistic
style (such as the brush work of the painter) and not only on
the content of the scene (Augustin et al., 2008; Cupchik et al.,
2009; and see also Cavanagh and Perdreau, 2011; Di Dio et al.,
2011).
The above notion brings to mind the unique character of
abstract art, which, unlike representational art and other forms
of art mentioned above, does not exemplify objects or entities
familiar to our visual system during daily life experience. Still, as
all visual information, abstract art is perceived via the same system
that was developed primarily in order to functionally represent
real-world objects. This places abstract art in a unique position
within visual processing—far from the natural (“survival”) role
of that system. It is therefore intriguing to try and understand
why we are attracted to abstract art (as demonstrated by the huge
success of museum exhibitions of the abstract artwork, such as
those of Jackson Pollock). This must mean that abstract art, which
is a rather new human invention, offers something attractive to
the viewer’s brain. So I would like to ask: what does abstract art
offer to the viewer’s mind?
It should be noted that this article focuses on the two ends of
a continuum between representational art and abstract art, and
therefore not relating to the in-between category of paintings, i.e.,
semi-representational or semi-abstract works.
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NEURAL AND BEHAVIORAL CORRELATES OF ART/ABSTRACT
ART
A fundamental assumption of modern brain research is that each
action in mental/cognitive/emotional realms is correlated with a
corresponding specific brain activity pattern. Each activity repre-
sents and generates the resultant experience. It is therefore worth
seeking for the neural correlates of the abstract art experience
and attempting to extract the principles underlying the neural
processing of this form of art.
In an fMRI imaging study, Kawabata and Zeki (2004) demon-
strated that different categories of painting—landscape, portrait
and still life—evoked activity at localized and category-specific
brain regions. In contrast, abstract art did not activate a unique
localized brain region. Rather, brain activity related to abstract art
appeared in brain regions activated by all other categories as well.
Thus, when subtracting the fMRI signal generated by abstract art
from signals generated by representative art of the various types
(landscape, portraits, still life) then zero activity was observed.
This is surprising as one might assume that there would be
neural correlates (i.e., specific brain activity) for the specific
cognitive category recognition of abstract art. On the other hand,
because abstract art does not consist of clear well-characterized
objects, but rather is composed of basic visual elements such as
lines, spots, color patches and simple forms such as triangles, one
might expect the activity corresponding to these basic elements
to also appear in other categories of brain activity. In this case,
we should not expect a unique brain activity related to abstract
art as indeed was found by Kawabata and Zeki (2004) as well as
by Vartanian and Goel (2004). To put it differently, it seems that
we know that we view abstract art by realizing that what we view
does not belong to any other specific category of art. Namely, we
recognize abstract art by exclusion.
In addition to fMRI studies, abstract art was also stud-
ied by behavioral and by direct voltage electroencephalogaphy
(DC-EEG) methods. Combining behavioral and low-resolution
electromagnetic tomography analysis, Lengger et al. (2007)
demonstrated that observers preferred abstract and representa-
tional paintings in an equal manner. Yet the abstract stimuli
evoked more positive emotions. Representational artworks were
classified as more interesting, were understood better and induced
more associations (as reported subjectively by the observers).
Information about the painting (such as the title of the paining,
the artist’s name, the technique used) increased understanding
of each style (representational as well as abstract art), but it
did not change other parameters of evaluations (i.e., preference,
associations, emotions). Comparing brain activity in response
to representational and abstract paintings revealed significantly
higher activation for representational art works in several brain
regions, predominantly in the left frontal lobe and bilaterally in
the temporal, frontal and parietal lobes, limbic system, insula
and other areas as well. Increased brain activity in response to
representational art was mostly attributed to the process of object
recognition, and the activation of memory and associations sys-
tems. Introducing stylistic information seemed to reduce cortical
activation, for both representational and abstract art. The authors
concluded that information on artworks seems to facilitate the
neural processing of the stimuli.
The idea that knowledge and experience facilitate the process-
ing of the visual stimuli was also evident in the work of Solso
(2000). Solso monitored brain activity of a portrait-artist (via
fMRI) while he drew faces, and compared the artist’s brain activity
with that of a non-artist who was drawing the same faces. Brain
activity of the artist revealed less activity in face processing areas
(posterior parietal) than that of the non-artists. This lower level
of activation of the artist’s face recognition area indicates that he
may be more efficient in the processing of facial features than the
novice.
From the above experiments one may conclude that abstract
art, stylistic knowledge and experience all seems to reduce cortical
brain activity as compared to the relevant controls (represen-
tational art, stylistic knowledge and novice, correspondingly).
These results indicate that the analysis of abstract art evokes less
focal brain activation.
The study by Vartanian and Goel (2004), presents some
evidence that a reduction in subjective aesthetic preference is
correlated with decreased activity in certain brain areas involved
with reward systems, whereas greater aesthetic preference evoked
larger activity in other brain areas, involved with emotional
valence and attention. They found that, in general, representa-
tional paintings were preferred over abstract paintings. Corre-
lating brain activity (via fMRI) with aesthetic preference, the
researches demonstrated that activation in the right caudate
nucleus decreased with decreasing preference, while the activation
of fMRI signals in bilateral occipital gyri, left cingulate sulcus
and bilateral fusiform gyri, all increased in response to increasing
preference. These results imply that, because abstract art is less
preferred by the observer, there is less reward, less emotional
valence and reduced attention, all of which results in reduced
brain activity.
It has been claimed that during the processing of art works, two
different aspects take place—the processing of pictorial content
and the processing of the artistic style (Cupchik et al., 1992;
Augustin et al., 2008). In an event related potential (ERP) study,
Augustin et al. (2011) found that processing of style starts later
and develops more slowly than the processing of content (50
ms vs. 10 ms, respectively). They attribute this time difference
in processing of the artwork to the fact that classification of
content is extremely over-learned by humans as part of daily
object classification and recognition whereas style analysis is a
visual task that many have hardly ever experienced. They suggest
(after Leder et al., 2004), that stylistic information might be
processed as an abstract entity, which requires some high level
processing, rather than a combination of low level embedding
of features. This work also supports the notion that style specific
information and art experience would facilitate and influence the
perception of abstract art (more than of representational art). If
this is indeed the case then abstract art, which exposes us mostly
to the style of work and hardly to a significant content of it (as
no particular objects are depicted), is being processed mostly via
brain’s routes of style analysis; routes that are less familiar to, and
less used by, most people. In other words, abstract art introduces
us to unfamiliar (or less familiar) situation.
It should be noted that many of the brain imaging studies on
art rely on “reverse inference”, that is to say that an activation of a
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particular brain area is used as an indication for the engagement
of that brain’s area in a particular cognitive process. Whereas
activity of a particular brain area during a specific cognitive pro-
cess imply the involvement of that area in that cognitive function,
the reverse proposition needs a wider support, via high selectivity
of the response of that particular brain area, or increase in prior
probability of the particular cognitive process (Poldrack, 2006).
Another feature that might be enhanced while looking at
abstract art is how global is the pattern of observation when con-
crete recognizable objects are missing in the pictorial scene. Such
lack of objects enables a more uniform global gaze. For example,
Taylor et al. (2011) investigated eye tracking of viewers appreci-
ating Jackson Pollock’s paintings, showing that the viewers’ eyes
tend to scan rather uniformly the surface of the whole canvas.
This finding is in clear contrast to, by now classical, eye tracking
studies of representative art, whereby the eye teds to gaze mostly
on salient features in the painting (e.g., eyes, nose, trees, signature,
etc.) and to almost completely neglect the rest (majority) of the
painting’s surface (see for example Locher et al., 2007; Hari and
Kujala, 2009). The work of Taylor et al. (2011) supports the notion
that, while analyzing abstract art, the visual/perception system
is less engaged with focal and converging gaze but rather to a
more homogeneous gaze. Again, a less familiar situation in our
daily experience (see related work by Zangemeister et al., 1995).
Another research found that in representational art, the eyes
fixate longer on the figurative details than in abstract paintings,
probably due to the lack figurative elements in the pictorial scene.
This holds for both experts and laypersons (Pihko et al., 2011).
SPECULATIONS REGARDING OUR ATTRACTION TO
ABSTRACT ART
Pictorial art analysis can be regarded as composed of three main
processes; (i) the brains’ effort to analyze the pictorial content
and style; (ii) the flood of associations evoked by it; and (iii) the
emotional response it generates (Bhattacharya and Petsche, 2002;
also see Freedberg and Gallese, 2007). Of course, being man-made
for no immediate practical use, art in general enables the viewer
to exercise a certain detachment from “reality” which, so it seems,
provides certain rewards to the art-lover.
But abstract art offers a particularly unique opportunity that
is evoked by visual stimulus which is not object-related and,
therefore, remote from our daily visual experience. This frees us,
to a large extent, from (automatically) activating object-related
systems in the brain whose task is to “seek” for familiar (memory-
based) compositions. Such “survival” mechanisms (e.g., “bind-
ing” and “figure ground separation”) are not activated via abstract
art, thus enabling us to form new “objects-free” associations that
may arise from more rudimental visual features such as lines,
colors and simple shapes. This conclusion is supported by both
the lack of specific brain region(s) for the processing of abstract
art exclusively (Kawabata and Zeki, 2004) as well as by the eye
tracking experiments (Taylor et al., 2011), demonstrating that in
abstract art, the eye (brain) is “free” to scan the whole surface
of the painting rather than “fall” mostly into well recognized
salient features, as is the case when processing representational
art. Abstract art may therefore encourage our brain to respond
in a less restrictive and stereotypical manner, exploring new
associations, activating alternative paths for emotions, and form-
ing new possibly creative links in our brain. It also enables us
to access early visual processes (dealing with simple features like
dots, lines and simple objects) that are otherwise harder to access
when a whole “gestalt” image is analyzed, as is the case with
representational art.
If indeed the above hypothesis were correct, then one would
expect a larger variability of individual response between people,
and at different times for same viewers, in brain response to
abstract art as compared to representational art. Indeed, such
variability was found by behavioral studies. Reflecting inner state
rather than obeying to the dominance of visual objects, the
response to abstract art is expected to be more dependent on one’s
particular inner state at a very specific moment, more so than
while observing representational art (which more automatically
activates the “survival”-related brain system). At some instances,
a particular abstract artwork might evoke strong association and
emotional response than in other times, when the inner state
of the viewer is less approachable, less amenable to processing
abstract art. A related prediction is that abstract art would acti-
vate more of the default system in the brain, associated with
inner-oriented processing. This prediction goes along with the
findings of Cela-Conde et al. (2013), which demonstrate the
involvement of the default mode network during the later phase
of aesthetic appreciation. Relevant to the current paper is the
claim expressed in the mentioned article, indicating the complex
relations between the inner thoughts and the processing of exter-
nal events (for more on the role and involvement of the default
system in art appreciation see also Vessel et al., 2012; Mantini and
Vanduffel, 2013).
In contrast, representative art would activate the extrinsic sys-
tem more powerfully, as this system is associated with processing
information arriving from the external environment (Golland
et al., 2008).
To conclude—abstract art is a very recent (100 years old or
so) invention of the human brain. Its success in attracting the
brains of so many of us suggests that it has an important cog-
nitive/emotional role. Supported by recent experimental studies, I
claim that abstract art frees our brain from the dominance of real-
ity, enabling the brain to flow within its inner states, create new
emotional and cognitive associations and activate brain-states
that are otherwise harder to access. This process is apparently
rewarding as it enables the exploration of yet undiscovered inner
territories of the viewer’s brain.
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